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ABSTRACT
DOES DEMOCRACY IMPACT THE LIVES OF THE POOR IN NICARAGUA?
By
Tanisha Shandie Brown Mitchel

University of New Hampshire, May, 2010

Does democracy help the poor? Nicaragua, the emphasis of this study, will be
used to analyze the impact democracy might be having on improving the lives of the
poor. The World Development Indicators (World Bank) and the Human Development
Index (United Nations) from 1992 - 2006 will be used in this study to measure economic
growth in Nicaragua. The Latin America Public Opinion Project data on Latin America
measures Nicaragua public opinion regarding democracy and economic growth in the
country.
The graphs from the World Bank illustrate that the standard of living for the poor
in Nicaragua is improving and that democracy has brought some economic growth. Still
the data from the LAPOP surveys in two different time periods 1991 and 2008 show that
the level of improvements does not indicate any drastic increase in growth of material
well being. The increase in consumer possession is significant, but not dramatic.

VI

CHAPTER I

Introduction
Nicaragua has experienced a transition from dictatorship to democracy but
remains one of the poorest countries in Central America. This raises an important
question: Does democracy help the poor? Democracy has been used as the
prescription for many of the political ills in third world nations. The question
remains however, whether or not democracy is key to helping improve the lives of
the poor in the world. Nicaragua, the main emphasis of this study, will be used to
analyze the impact democracy might be having on improving the lives of the
poor.
Many scholars in the field have debated the issue, positing that democracy
does promote growth while others argue that democracy has no effect on growth.
Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, they report that "it does not seem to be
democracy or authoritarianism per se that makes the difference but something
else. What that something else might be is far from clean'^Jonathan Hiskey
provides added clarity, focusing on the dynamics of local politics, arguing that
"the demand-based approach to fighting poverty is greatly enhanced by a

' Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi /'Political Regimes and Economic Growth," Journal of Economic
Perspective 3( Summer 1993): 441.

1

democratic local political environment."2 I will assess this debate in the case of
Nicaragua.
This study will use historical comparative analysis to analyze what impact
democracy might have on the poor suited for this research because it focuses specifically
on one country during a time period of political transition using several measures of
economic indicators gathered within that time frame. The World Development Indicators
(World Bank) and the Human Development Index (United Nations) from 1992 - 2006
will be used in this study to measure economic growth in Nicaragua. The Latin America
Public Opinion Project data on Latin America measures Nicaragua public opinion
regarding democracy and economic growth in the country. Survey data from the same
source (LAPOP) will be used to analyze the individual level of analysis of respondents'
own assessments of their economic situation.

2

Jonathan Hiskey," Demand-Based Development and Local Electoral Enviroment in Mexico," Comparative
Politics 1 ( October 2003): 56.

2

This research is particularly relevant to the world we live in today. In
Nicaragua economic development and poverty reduction have historically been
intertwined with political development at both macro and micro levels. Nicaragua
remains a country where life for the majority is difficult and opportunity to substantially
improve the standard of living among the majority of the population is limited. Today
with the exception of Cuba, democracy has hit each corner of Latin America. Just like
Nicaragua, many of these countries are still suffering from extreme poverty. Many
Latinos are leaving their families and homes to migrate to the United States to escape the
poverty that exists in their countries. Is democracy a possible solution to this real life
epidemic, which is faced by the majority of the world's population?
The questions asked in this study are: If a country becomes a democratic state
will this bring economic growth? Does a stable democratic state guarantee its people a
stable economy? The research facts presented here will try to provide answers to these
questions using the situation of Nicaragua as a case study.
This research proceeds in five chapters. This introductory chapter is followed by
a second chapter that reviews the literature. The third chapter presents a historical
overview of Nicaragua. The fourth chapter presents an analysis of Nicaragua's growth
and the effects of democracy since the 1990's. Findings and conclusion are found in the
fifth chapter.

3

Chapter II

DOES DEMOCRACY HELP THE POOR?
Table 1: Overview of Theoretical Arguments
Democracy Helps
•

Doh Chull Shi argues, "Citizens of democratic
states experience a far better quality of life than
those in non-democracies."

•

David Brown and Wendy Hunter add,
"Democratic regimes are associated with higher
rates of social expenditures when faced with
important economic constraints."4

•

Thomas Zweifel and Patricio Navia report,
"Fewer children die in democracies than in
dictatorships."5

•

Hiskey concludes, "The demand-based approach
tofightingpoverty is greatly enhanced by a
democratic local political environment."

Democracy Hurts
• Michael Ross observes "democracies spend more
money on education and health care than nondemocracies, but these benefits seem to accrue to
middle and upper income groups."
• Przeworski and Limongi suggest, "we do not know
whether democracy fosters or hinders economic
growth."
• Helliwell adds regarding the effect of "democracy
on subsequent economic growth, the evidence in
this article pours cold water on the notion that
introducing democracy is likely to accelerate
subsequent growth."9
• De Haan and Siermann suggest that, "the

3

Doh Chull Shin, " On the Third Wave of Democratization: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory
and Research," World Politics 1 ( October 1994): 156.

4

David S. Brown and Wendy Hunter Brown, " Democracy and Social Spending in Latin America," The
American Political Science Review 4 (December 1999): 779.
5

Thomas D. Zweifel and Patricio Navia, " Democracy, Dictartorship and Infant Mortality," Journal of
Democracy 2( April 2000): 99.
6

Jonathan Hiskey, " Demand-Based Development and Local Electoral Enviroment in Mexico,"
Comparative Politics 1 ( October 2003): 56.
7

Michael Ross, " Is Democracy Good for the Poor?," American Journal of Political Science 4 (October
2006): 860.
8

Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi /'Political Regimes and Economic Growth," Journal of
Economic Perspective 3( Summer 1993): 440.
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relationship between democracy and economic
growth is not robust."10
•

Erich Weede concludes,"the overall effect of
political democracy on economic growth is
negative, but rather weak."11

• Mitchell Seligson, "In Nicaragua, the study finds
evidence supporting the World Bank's hypothesis
of a link between corruption and erosion of belief
in the legitimacy of the political system."

We have scholars that have assessed the impact of a particular governing system
on poverty arguing that regime type does matter and that democracy is better than most
all systems at improving the lives of the poor. They argue that democracies allow more
poor people to vote for redistributive policies. In addition democracies will invest in
human capital and social services that will benefit the poor.
Thomas Zweifel and Patricio Navia are among those who make the argument that
regime type does have an impact on the economic growth of a nation. In their study, the
authors used the infant mortality rate, a measure most frequently used by politicians and
international groups. A total of 138 countries were selected and observed over a time
frame from 1950-90. The data indicated that indeed, countries governed by a democratic
system presented a significantly lower infant mortality rate than countries under
9

John F. Helliwell, " Empirical Linkages between Democracy and Economic Growth," British Journal of
Political Science 2 (April 1994): 244.
10

Jakob de Haan and Clemens L. J. Siermann, " New Evidence on the Relationship between Democracy
and Economic Growth," Public Choice lA (January 1996): 193.
11

Enrich Weede, " The Impact of Democracy on Economic Growth: Some Evidence from Cross-National
Analysis,"Kyklos 36 ( 1983): 35.

12

Mitchel A. Seligson, "Corruption and Democratization What is to be done? Public Integrity (Summer
2001) 227.
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dictatorships. As the authors put it, "fewer children die in democracies than in
dictatorships."13
Zweifel and Navia noted "democracy outperformed dictatorship at every level of
per-capita GNP. It is well known that per-capita income is inversely correlated with
hunger: the higher a country's per-capita GNP, the lower the number of hungry people in
that country."14 The authors argued that under a democratic regime there are more
opportunities for the poor to improve their economic condition in comparison to a
dictatorship. They
democracies are likely to provide their citizens with a wider array of
opportunities. Opportunity may take many forms, including access to education, freedom
from absentee landlords, the absence of war, the provision of credits and income, the
freedom to space birth, or simply a cow of one's own. Opportunity gives people greater
power to shape their own destiny, enabling them to be more self-sufficient.1

In support of this argument, Brown and Hunter focus on the impact of regime
type by investigating the "relationship between democracy and the change in social
spending controlling for GDP, debt, inflation, and age structure of the population through
a time series of cross-sectional panels and with a data set for 17 Latin American countries
from 1980 to 1992."16 The authors do note that in poor countries a democratic
government is more likely to reduce social spending that would help improve the lives of
13

Ibid.

14

Ibid.

15

Ibid., 109.

16

David S. Brown and Wendy Hunter Brown, " Democracy and Social Spending in Latin America," The
American Political Science Review 4 (December 1999): 779.
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the poor. However, they also point out that "authoritarian regimes display greater
sensitivity than their democratic counterparts to economic constraints. For example, when
facing low levels of per-capita income and negative rates of growth, authoritarian
governments reduce social spending at a faster rate than democracies."17
Additionally, democracies are more prone to reduce social spending only when it
might be beneficial for the poor, meaning they tend to make smarter choices that will
improve the living standards of the poor, while authoritarian regimes reduce spending
without analyzing the effects it might have on the poor.18
The authors found that democratic regimes actually show higher rates of social
spending even when encountered with major economic constraints. They argue that
democratic regimes are the most beneficial form of government in third world nations
suffering from extreme poverty since a democracy tends to offer its citizens better
economic performance that does not include dramatic reduction in social spending, an
action that would tend to affect the poorest segments of the population.19 In other words
the author's findings suggest that a democratic government is the best suited for
improving the lives of the poor because they invest more on social programs that more
directly and quickly impact the poor.
Adding to the Brown and Hunter argument is Doh Chull Shin, who notes,
"Citizens of democratic states experience a far better quality of life than those of non17

Ibid.

18

Ibid.,779.

19

Ibid., 789

7

democracies. Even in democracies, citizens of consistently democratic states were found
to be 30 percent better-off than those of inconsistently democratic states."20 Shin
emphasizes that nations transitioning from authoritarian to democratic rule are not
guaranteed instant economic growth.21 He explains that democracies, "merely create
22

more opportunities and better possibilities than existed before to become such a nation."
Shin's explains that his main focus is "examining the conceptual and methodological
issues of defining and measuring democratization along with the theoretical and strategic
issues of explaining and promoting it."23
He notes that new democracies might experience some difficulties adjusting to
economic transformation and welfare; it would be very unlikely that present democracies
would revert to authoritarian government because the international community has
promoted and pressed for the influence of democracies.24
Jonathan Hiskey adds to this argument examining local political regimes and the
impact these smaller units have on development programs designed to give the poor

Doh Chull Shin, " On the Third Wave of Democratization: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory
and Research," World Politics 1 (October 1994): 156.
21

Ibid.,157.

22

Ibid.

23

Doh Chull Shin, " On the Third Wave of Democratization: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory
and Research," World Politics 1 (October 1994): 137.
24

Ibid., 170.
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opportunities to participate in projects likely to benefit their communities.

Hiskey

examined Mexico as a case study since it is considered a great example of the "centralist
tradition" that has dominated political organizations in Latin America.

The author

analyzed results of the National Solidarity Program (PRONASOL) that was the most
prominent development strategy pursued by developing nations during the 1990's. The
objective of PRONASOL was to allow local governments and members of the
community to participate in decision-making about major projects affecting their
communities. The program expected strong participation and representation from each
community participating in a project. The success of each project was measured by the
accountability and level of participation from each member of the community

in order

to test the connection between local politics and the development impact of PRONASOL,
237 municipalities in the Mexican states of Jalisco and Michoacan are analyzed. The
author found that a "demand -based approach to fighting poverty is greatly enhanced by
a democratic local political environment." The author offers a plausible explanation
suggesting that communities, municipalities and local government in developing nations
should require substantial citizens' participation since the likely result would be, that
though corruption cannot completely be erased, it would be more balanced. The types of
participation expected, as Hiskey describes them, are the "basic freedoms of assembly,

25

Jonathan Hiskey, " Demand-Based Development and Local Electoral Enviroment in Mexico,"
Comparative Politics 1 ( October 2003): 44.
26
Ibid.
27

Ibid., 41.

9

association, participation, and political voice, critical in programs that call for citizens to
organize and submit proposals to program officials, work in concert with municipal
officials to prioritize and implement projects, and hold both government and program
officials accountable for the outcome of projects."28 It is logical that democracy would
reduce poverty at a local level if local governments and members of each community are
active participants in the outcome of each project and, since such participation is a
hallmark of democratic action. Levels of corruption that exist in these local governments
may be more likely to decrease.
Hiskey argues that "increasing citizen voice and the public accountability
through both participation and better governance can lead to greater efficacy in
government action."29 Public participation is the best way to accomplish accountability
from government officials by demanding and interacting in activities and policies that
indirectly and directly affect the people. This type of citizen's involvement can even have
a stronger effect at the sub-national level, meaning that within development projects that
have strong citizen's participation, there is more likely to be promotion of an accountable
and effective municipal government that will reduce poverty.
On the other side of the argument, we have scholars that argue that regime type
does not impact growth. For one thing, democracies have uneven economic records that
can't promote economic growth that will reach the poor according to Michael Ross. The
28

Ibid.,56.

10

author uses data on infant and child mortality rates to strengthen his skepticism about any
positive impact democracy has had on the poorest segment of a population. His main
argument has been that "democracies spend more money on education and health care
than non-democracies, but these benefits seem to accrue to middle and upper income
groups."31 Ross argues,
There is good evidence that democracies fund public services at a higher level
than nondemocracies. But it is not obvious that these infusions of money actually reach
the poor; nor is it obvious that they produce better social outcomes, such as longer,
healthier, or more productive lives. If democracies produce better outcomes for lowincome families, then countries that transition from autocratic to democratic rule should
see improvements in their infant and child mortality rates.32
He suggests that the reason why we view democracy as a good thing for the poor
is due to the fact that " cross- national studies tend to exclude from their samples nondemocratic states that have performed well; this leads to the mistaken inference that nondemocracies have worse records than democracies."33
Ross found a small but not significant amount of evidence that democracies play a
part in the reduction of infant and child mortality rates. He says, conclusively, that
democracy does not offer any economic benefits for the poor. Democracy does provide
political rights and liberties but for the poor these political rights and liberties probably

31

Michael Ross, " Is Democracy Good for the Poor?," American Journal of Political Science 4 (October
2006): 860.
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have little if any effect on their standard of living.

Ross' argument is that the poor have

very little influence in any decision-making that might affect their well being under any
political regime.
Do political regimes have any impact on economic growth? In a seminal work,
Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, review the literature and point out that
previous research has credited regime type with growth without trying to logically
attribute the specific factors that have impacted economic growth. They report there is
substantial evidence to support the argument that politics does influence growth, and they
demonstrate that the differences between democracies and dictatorships are not
consistent.35 The authors argue that one regime type, democratic or authoritarian, does
not prove to be more effective than the other.
The authors note the example of the disadvantage presented in the examination
of regime types related to economic well -being when,
in averaging the rates of growth often South American countries between 1946
and 1988, one discovers that authoritarian regimes grew at the average rate of 2.15
percent per annum while democratic regimes grew at 1.31 percent. Hence, one is inclined
to conclude that authoritarianism is better for growth than democracy. But suppose in fact
regimes have no effect on growth."36 The authors found that by changing their selections
and generating "unbiased means for the two regimes' these, not surprisingly, reproduced
the assumption under which the data were generated: no difference in growth between the
two regimes.37
J4

Ibid.,872.

35

Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi /'Political Regimes and Economic Growth," Journal of
Economic Perspective 3( Summer 1993): 435.

36

Ibid., 439.
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The authors argue that they have no answer to whether or not democracy
generates or limits economic growth. What is clear, they assert, is that "it does not seem
to be democracy or authoritarianism per se that makes the difference but something else.
What that something else might be is far from clear."
Democracy tends to be associated with economic growth despite the fact that we
continue to witness strong levels of poverty and inequality in democratic nations such as
Nicaragua. Przeworski and Limongi's research suggest that there is no empirical
evidence that links democracy or, per se, any type of regime with economic growth. The
authors admit that since neither democracy nor authoritarianism seems to influence
growth the answer may come with more research. What influences growth if it is not
regime type?
Mitchel Seligson argues that the reason why democracy is not successful in third
world countries like Nicaragua is due to corruption, weakening the impact of democracy
on growth. This suggests that if levels of corruption are high in Nicaragua citizens might
be able to vote while politicians and other members of the government are using funds
destined for anti-poverty programs for their benefits. Seligson says, in "Nicaragua, the
study finds evidence supporting the World Bank's hypothesis of a link between
corruption and erosion of belief in the legitimacy of the political system."39 He argues

38

Ibid., 441.
Mitchel A. Seligson, "Corruption and Democratization What is to be done? Public Integrity (Summer
2001) 227.

39

13

that democracy is not going to be effective if citizens have no trust in a political system
that fails to promote economic development and improvements in their lives.
In order to analyze the impact corruption is having on democracy Seligson used
two survey studies, the first one completed in 1996 and the second in 1998 the
anticorruption campaign main objective fight against corruption. The purpose of the
campaign was to assess how Nicaraguan's felt about the corruption in Nicaragua, to test
how to go about creating a solution to the problem and how to encourage Nicaraguans
greater confidence in the political system.
The campaign was put into practice by a Nicaraguan nongovernmental
organization, Grupo Fundemos. The goal was to inform Nicaraguans "about a major
financial management reform initiative being implemented by the government, with
technical and financial support from the international donor community (USAID, the
World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank)"41 with the objective of
reducing the levels of corruption in Nicaragua.
The campaign worked directly with the people by using the media and other
advertisement sources to bring awareness and participation in the project among the
Nicaraguan public. The campaign proved to be a powerful tool in fighting corruption.
The author found that "the public awareness campaign not only increased citizen's ability

40

Mitchel A. Seligson, "Corruption and Democratization What is to be done? Public Integrity (Summer
2001) 222.

41

Mitchel A. Seligson, "Corruption and Democratization What is to be done? Public Integrity (Summer
2001)226.
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to define transparency, it also has a direct impact on their awareness of Nicaragua's
several financial management and anticorruption institutions."42
In countries like Nicaragua corruption levels are high and politicians frequently
exploit funds destined to improve the lives of its citizens. This leaves no place for trust in
either democracy or the government system. For these reasons, anticorruption campaigns
are crucial in promoting transparency in the government system and public support and
participation are vital for its success.
Helliwell's contributes to this effort by evaluating the linkages between
democracy and economic growth. In his study the author used cross sectional and pooled
data from a total of 125 countries during the time frame from 1960 to 1985.43 The author
selected 125 countries, the largest number of countries that could be used, for the purpose
of getting a strong selection of per capita real incomes. He also incorporates political and
civil liberties to further analyze the impact these might have during the growth of a
nation. To determine the impact that democracy has on economic growth the study was
reduced to a smaller selection of ninety-eight countries to factor for the time periods of
the 1960 to 1985. Education is also included, since education is considered to be a
principal part of growth in democracies.

The growth performance of 1960-85 eras

provides an examination of the GDP per capita as well as the "investment rates in human

42

Ibid.,234.

43

John F. Helliwell, " Empirical Linkages between Democracy and Economic Growth," British Journal of
Political Science 2 (April 1994): 225.
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and physical capital."

By mixing democracy with political freedoms the author is able

to analyze what impact the political system has on the overall growth of a nation. 45
Helliwel found that countries with population consisting of higher income levels
tend to have democratic forms of government. Still this result does not indicate a
complete positive effect of democracy on economic growth. "It has been shown that this
positive effect does not appear to be the result of reverse causation: estimates of the
reverse effect of democracy on subsequent growth indicate that this feedback is more
likely to be negative than positive."

To add, countries with lower growth rates or per

capita income initially start off with a higher growth rate, slowly decreasing as income
data is combined with richer countries. The author argues that a possible explanation to
this decrease is that countries adapt to their new democratic governments during the
initial stage of development. The author continues by arguing that certain parts of a
democratic system can be more productive in promoting growth than others. He also
points out that other factors such as culture that were not factored in this study can
influence the connection between democracy and growth. Despite this argument it is
"still unclear whether the adaptation of a democratic government contributes to growth
rate convergence by reducing the subsequent growth of the democratizing countries." 7 It

44

Ibid.,226.

45

Ibid., 226-227.

46

Ibid.,244.

47

Ibid.,244.
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is also unclear how certain aspects of democratic governments might contribute to or
decrease the possibilities for economic growth.
The author concludes that there is a positive effect between per capita income and
the process of assimilation to democracy and he interprets this to mean that democracies
are a preferable choice of government as countries become more industrialized and
citizens become educated. Helliwel also discusses how the results in this study also prove
it is unlikely that democracy can increase growth. Instead, the statistical modification
considered in this study leads to a negative direct result of democracy on growth.49 He
argues that this negative response was statistically low and insignificant and it was
counterbalanced by the indirect positive results of investment and education. The author
thus argues that democracy has a greater influence through education and investment than
on overall economic growth. This strengthens the argument that democracy does not
directly influence economic growth but instead, institutions that influence democracies
might promote and accelerate growth.
In contradiction to Helliwell's argument, De Haan and Siermann also examine
the relationship between democracy and economic growth. The authors argue that the
connection between democracy and economic growth is not robust and democratic
freedoms are not positively connected to growth. Initially, uncensored media and open
public debate can reveal important government information that can interrupt

Ibid., 244-245.

Ibid., 246.

17

development. It "can also be said that political and civil freedoms make it harder for
government or the private sector to make tough but necessary decisions."50
The authors disagree with previous studies suggesting that democratic freedoms
have an impact on growth. They attribute this to the use of Gastil's ranking survey
publications despite the fact that the survey offers a consistent time series available only
from 1973 onwards. The growth period that is considered to be the most efficient starts in
the 1960s. "Given a likely positive relationship between income levels and democracy,
using a measure of democracy in the middle or the end of the sample period runs the risk
that a possible effect of democracy on growth is masked by the reserve effect of income
level on democracy."51 Another downfall is that the Gastil's ranking does not take into
account that the democratic qualities of a country can vary over time. Thus, just focusing
on the Gastil ranking might lead to biased results.
De Haan and Siermann's study adds to previous research from many angles by
introducing a variety of measures of democracy that cover longer periods of time than the
Gastil rankings. They add a measure that takes into account the length of time that a
country can be considered a democracy. Regime types are also analyzed and included in
their study. The examinations of Learner (1983) and Levine and Rene It (1992) bound

Jakob de Haan and Clemens L. J. Siermann, " New Evidence on the Relationship between Democracy
and Economic Growth," Public Choice lA (January 1996): 175.
51

Ibid., 176.
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analysis are included in the study to strengthen the authors' findings.

De Haan and

Siermann suggest that democracy comes at a costly price in relation to improving living
standards. The authors argue that recent studies on economic growth have argued that
"lack of civil and political liberties is negatively correlated with economic growth."
They continue by adding that in both Learner (1983) and Levine and Renelt (1992),
analysis was used to help determine the connection between regime type and economic
growth. The authors found that the connection between democracy and economic growth
is not significant. Despite, the likeliness of a connection between these variables is still
not significant. Despite, the likeliness of a connection between these variables is still not
significant. Added, this is sufficient for the coefficient to become irrelevant.55 The main
argument the authors put forward is that the relationship between democracy and growth
is not significantly strong and democratic freedoms do not have positive influence on
growth.
Erich Weede examines the impact of democracy on economic growth by using a
cross national and cross- sectional multiple regression examination with data collected
from 1960s and 1970s.56 The author uses two-indicators, the GNPC Gross National
Product and the GDP Gross Domestic Product, to determine the impact of democracy on

53

Ibid., 177.

54

Ibid., 192.

55
56

Ibid., 193.
Enrich Weede, " The Impact of Democracy on Economic Growth: Some Evidence from Cross-National
Analysis,"Kyklos 36 ( 1983): 24.

19

economic growth. Weede's data has led many researchers to argue that democracy can
provide economic growth; especially as measured in third world nations suffering
extreme poverty.57
Weede argues that, "while democracy might affect growth rates, growth rates are
unlikely to affect democratic performance at least not in the short run.... The overall
effect of political democracy on economic growth is negative, but rather weak."

He

adds that in countries where the state manages most of the economy regardless if is more
or less developed, political democracy becomes an obstacle for economic growth.59 He
emphasizes that especially in less developed nations the possible negative effect of
democracy on growth is insignificant. If we want to ignore the differences that these two
variables, democracy and growth, offer, "we should rather limit government interference
in or (mis) management of, the economy."60 The author's findings suggest that
democracy has a negative impact on growth by examining both GNPC and GPD income
levels that measure the growth levels of a nation. Democracy has no linkage with
economic growth. This leads one to say that the spread of democracy in Nicaragua will
not improve the lives of the poor and what other factors might positively influence
growth are still unknown as argued by Przeworski and Limongi.

57

Ibid.,21.

58

Ibid., 35.

59

Ibid.,36.

60

Ibid„ 36.
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Clearly then, Scholars do disagree on the relationship between democracy and
poverty. Democracy can either hurt or improve the living standard of the poor. Ross
argues that democracy does not benefit the poor because it feeds more power to the
middle class than those in the lower class. To strengthen this argument Przeworski and
Limongi suggest, "we do not know whether democracy fosters or hinders economic
growth."61 The authors concluded with "it does not seem to be democracy or
authoritarianism per se that makes a difference, but something else."62 Seligson adds that
"in Nicaragua, the study finds evidence supporting the World Bank's hypothesis of a link
between corruption and erosion of belief in the legitimacy of the political system."63
Helliwell adds that in examining the effect of "democracy on subsequent economic
growth, the evidence in this article pours cold water on the notion that introducing
democracy is likely to accelerate subsequent growth."64 The findings of De Haan and
Siermann suggest that, "the relationship between democracy and economic growth is not
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robust."

And Weede concludes his study arguing that, "the overall effect of political

democracy on economic growth is negative, but rather weak."66
Opposing these arguments are scholars who posit that democracy does help
improve the living standard of the poor. Doh Chull Shi argues, "citizens of democratic
states experience a far better quality of life than those in non-democracies."67 Brown
and Hunter add, "democratic regimes are associated with higher rates of social
expenditures when faced with important economic constraints."68 Zweifel and Navia
report, "fewer children die in democracies than in dictatorships."69 Hiskey concludes,
"The demand-based approach to fighting poverty is greatly enhanced by a democratic
local political environment."70 To add to this debate, my study tests these theories in
Nicaragua. Each author as discussed above was able to offer a plausible explanation as
to why democracy helps or hurt the poor. These findings are useful in analyzing the
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impact democracy has on the living standard of the poor in Nicaragua and what a nation
needs to accomplish in order to make democracy a better fit for everyone in that
society.
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CHAPTER III

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Anastasio Somoza (1936-1957) Beginning to End of the Dynasty:
Nicaraguan political history is checkered with the interests of the Spanish, British
and United States military and political intervention in the country. Nicaraguan history is
also filled with evidence of conflicts of interest among those who fought to govern the
country. As Humberto Belli has pointed out,
The formation of a national state, based on impersonal and rational bureaucracies and
laws, was all but impossible. Instead, political conflicts and agreements boiled down to
arrangements between individuals and thereby favored those that involved blood relations or
friendship. The poor-those campesinos, peons, and artisans who made up the mass of the political
factions and the private armies came under the control of diverse local oligarchies whose
protection and favor they sought, thereby strengthening patron-client relationships.7I
The growth of coffee production in Nicaragua divided the country into two major
political groups in which each had respective locations, the liberals in Leon City located
about 100 km northeast of the capital Managua and the conservatives in Granada which
sets on the western shore of Lago de Nicaragua, some 45km southeast of Managua.72 The
coffee growers, and their respective caudillos, represented the oligarchy that controlled
the Nicaraguan political system,
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From 1858 until 1893, leaders of the Granada faction occupied the presidency of the
republic, but Liberals from Leon were included in the cabinet and in the National Congress.
During these years, political peace and a growing demand on the world market for coffee set the
basis for Nicaragua's modern export economy.73
However, the power struggle between liberals and conservatives and the new
coffee growers created new political conflicts in the early nineteen-century. While this
took place, Anastasio Somoza Garcia, who came from a family of wealthy coffee
planters, was able to rise as the head of the Nicaraguan National Guard. Somoza
occupied himself with the pursuit of his own political goals to become the new president
in the 1936 election. Somoza did not waste any time trying to accomplish his goal,
especially knowing that the current president Juan Bautista Sacasa's objective was to
prevent him from becoming the new president.
Somoza immediately began organizing his campaign in local communities and
by November of 1934, he had organized a group of "somozistas." These somozista
groups assured Somoza their vote and the promotion of his candidacy. Despite the fact
that Sacasa's administration had prohibited any political campaigning until eight months
before the election, these Somozista supporters continued there campaigning in secret.74
Somoza was the head of the Nicaraguan National Guard (Guardia Nacional) and
they themselves played a crucial role in promoting his candidacy. The Guardia officers
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were involved in promoting and advertising his campaign; they organized events, gave
speeches and collected funds from Somoza sympathizers and personal friends.75 During
his campaign, Somoza presented a new image to the Nicaraguan people different from
the traditional leaders. His focus during his campaign was to separate himself from
politics and to assure the populace that he did not fall under the traditional political
system of corruption and failed promises that had ruled Nicaragua.76Somoza did not
possess the skills required to be president of Nicaragua but his position as head of the
National Guard gave him the opportunity to promote himself into that position. Somoza,
"was limited in administrative experience, Somoza's major talents were his personal
charm and his ability to extricate himself from scrapes with the law." 77
Somoza was able to gain control and become the president of Nicaragua in the 1936
election due to several factors affecting the country's stability and growth. Nicaragua was
going through a Great Depression with the collapse of coffee prices, and decades of
constant interference in Nicaraguan affairs by the United States. Nicaraguan politicians
had been unable to solve the problems the country faced. The National Guard, a national
police force, was generally needed for its power to control the domestic situation.
Somoza took advantage of his position and thus became the president of Nicaragua. Once
elected, the National Guard was the main foundation of Somoza's political administration
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for the next twenty years, after the elimination of the previous president Juan Bautista
Sacasa. With the guard and the Liberal party volunteers in Leon on his side, there was no
question that Somoza had successfully taken control of the Nicaragua.78
Somoza used the National Guard to pursue his own personal and political
interests. The Guard dominated all institutions and forms of government in Nicaragua,
controlling,
A broad range of public functions. It operated the national radio and telegraph
networks, the postal service, and the immigration service. It controlled customs, taking
special interest in the important arms, munitions, and explosives. It conducted all police
functions and controlled the National Health Services. The guard collected taxes and
operated the railways."79
Somoza was clever and quick in making sure that he remained in power. There
were attempts to destroy him but he managed to stay in power due to his corrupt and
efficient system. The question is, how was he able to stay in power for next twenty years
building his empire, clearly a dictatorship, in which he dominated the country through his
military power? In fact the United States was interfering in Nicaragua's politics by
supporting Somoza's dictatorship. During the years of Somoza rule, Nicaraguan political
institutions were filled with corruption, violence, torture and repression with the National
Guard involved to full extent. Nicaragua's political system had been clearly linked to
family ties and personal interest from both international and internal players, who
founded an undemocratic government as a tool to interfere with or to gain power.
Somoza openly had all types of financial support from the United States and was able to
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strengthen his control of the National Guard on which he relied to control the Nicaraguan
society. Somoza "wheedled from Roosevelt help to reestablish the Guard military
Academy, to organize a navy, and to build a highway to Rama in the Atlantic zone, a
major infrastructure project."80
The Nicaraguan economy suffered tremendously during Somoza rule. Small farmers
lost their land to the large wealthy landowners. The upper class slowly was taking away
every source of wealth the poor possessed. They owned vast amounts of land and to
subsist, the poor remained to cultivate land they did not control, but which they needed in
order to survive. The gap between the upper class and the lower class intensified and
grew stronger during the years Somoza ruled. Somoza's personal wealth grew as well.
"By 1944 he owned fifty-one cattle ranches, and his forty-six coffee plantations made
him the largest coffee producer in Nicaragua."82 He exploited his power to every extent
and took advantage of the country's weak financial institutions, making wealth accessible
to his representatives, family members and those who supported his administration by
giving loans out by preference.83
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The major economic setbacks Nicaragua suffered occurred during Somoza
period were the 1930's great depression and World War II. These two major events
affected the Nicaraguan economy severely; with the coffee, sugar and banana production
declining drastically. All these commodities coffee, sugar and bananas were main
sources of wealth for the Nicaraguan economy during Somoza's government. During his
regime, the goal for every wealthy landowner was to gain more land. This affected
tremendously the ability to develop a middle class in Nicaragua society. The majority of
Nicaragua's labor force cultivated these export products for Nicaragua. Labor unions and
organizations were demanding new labor reforms; there was constant conflict and protest
against a lack of labor rights and Somoza, at some point, tried to deal with the problem
by making false promises.84 Once he gained support of the major labor groups, "he
dismantled the new labor reforms, took over and corrupted union leadership, violently
Of

purged the former union leaders, and forced many unionists and socialists into exile."
By mid-twentieth century, five factors had caused great new concentration of capital
in Nicaragua: 1) the greatly increased land concentration in the coffee and cotton
industries; 2) the coffee and cotton price increases (and the cotton cultivation boom)
beginning in the late 1940's;
3) the expanded ties of Nicaraguan capitalists to U.S. banks and investors; 4) the
political peace purchased by Somoza through permitting Conservative factions
participation in government; and 5) the growing role of Somoza and his family in the
86
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Somoza's oppressive regime provoked his own death by the hands of Rigoberto
Lopez a twenty-seven years old poet and print shop worker who had just returned from El
Salvador where he had spent five years preparing for the anti-Somoza attack.

Somoza

died on September 29, 1956 leaving behind his two sons, Luis and Anastasio, both of
whom immediately took control.
The Somoza brothers were trained to replace their father's position. Once he died
they immediately continued his oppressive system. Despite attempts by the Nicaraguan
people to bring an end to the Somoza's family authoritarianism, their power and control
had grown to great extent. During the Somoza Garcia autocracy the United States
provided all sorts of support and once the Somoza brothers took charge this support
continued. The United States supplied the Somoza brothers with economic aid and
military support that strengthened their government and enriched the brothers. All types
of U.S financial assistance poured into Nicaragua from 1953 through 1975 amounting to
about 17.3 million. This support discouraged the Nicaraguan people from fighting against
the Somoza brothers who became the strongest and most powerful force in Nicaragua.

The economic situation in Nicaragua under Luis and Anastacio did not improve.
In 1972 a major earthquake devastated Managua, disrupting the stability of Nicaragua.
The constant revolt and violence against the government scared investors away and with
the country dealing with an extreme natural disaster, the Nicaraguan people where fed up
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with the government and were ready for change. The poverty in Nicaragua had continued
to spread in "part because the government repressed unions, kept wages low, and
undertook no effective agrarian reform. Thus Nicaragua's internal market remained
small, and most manufactured goods were exported. New industries had to import much
SO

of the raw materials used, increasing external dependencies." With few jobs being
created for the lower class to survive off, the poor were frightened and ready to make a
difference. This constant economic recession the country was facing, while the Somoza
family and other upper class groups continued to benefit the profits, provoked a
revolution that strengthened the Sandinista Movement. That movement had started before
Somoza became president but had intensified over the years with all the injustice of
human rights violations, brutality and humiliations the Nicaraguan people had
experienced from the hands of the Somoza's brothers and father.
Many of those who actively opposed the regime felt Somoza's cruel hand; most
of Nicaragua's current revolutionary leaders spent time in jail or suffered torture. But
Somoza's repression backfired. It undoubtedly cowed and destroyed some opponents, but
it increased the resolved and the numbers of others. Between this and the growing
economic frustrations of the lower strata, even a committed and institutionally strong
regime would have faced serious challenges. But forty years of Somocismo had swelled
and corrupted the state, spoiled and divided the upper class, and perverted the instruments
of security.90
Sandino and the vision of the Revolution:
The idea behind the Sandinista revolution was to pursue the goals of the legendary
Augusto Cesar Sandino, a nationalist and liberal who wanted to liberate and free
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Nicaragua from any external power and make Nicaragua for Nicaraguans. Sandino
incorporated nationalist, socialist and communist thought in forming his revolutionary
ideas. The Mexican Revolution inspired most of his ideology. The principle was to
fight until death against imperialism and those who oppress others and enriched
themselves off the hard labor of the poor.

!

His vision was to free Nicaragua from

the Somoza regime. Somoza murdered him before he was able to accomplish this
goal. The Sandinistas used Sandino's ideology to capture the Nicaraguan revolution
and to continue the fight against the Somoza regime and later, the United States,
during the Contra War. The (FSLN) Frente Sandinista de Liberacion National
continued the vision of the legendary Sandino, absorbing new influences from the
new Marxism ideology that inspired the Cuban Revolution with leaders such as Fidel
Castro and Che Guevara.92
Sandinismo took its first stand with the support of Carlos Fonseca Amador and Col
Alberto Bayo, who had a great impact during both the Cuban Revolution and the
Nicaraguan Revolutions. Carlos Fonseca Amador was the first to recover "Sandino
political thought." Even though Bayo did not help in recovering Sandino political
thought, he dedicated himself to making sure that Sandino's vision for Nicaragua was
not lost or forgotten but would be continued as a mission for Nicaragua. He collected
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Sandino political thoughts recovered by Fonseca and created a guerrilla manual that
contained an oral and written legacy of Sandino's vision for the revolution. Sandinismo
was a movement against the dictatorship of the Somoza family and the fight to establish
democracy in Nicaragua.
Revolutionaries such as Col. Bayo, Carlos Fonseca, Che Guevara and Fidel
Castro wanted to capture the work of Sandino. Strategies such as Bayo's were created
to capture the vision of the legendary Nicaraguan Hero who fought for freedom and
justice. As argued by the author Donald Hodges, "Nicaragua was the first country in
which the written and unwritten legacies of a great folk hero and national redeemer
became impregnated with the new Marxism, the first instance of the confluence of two
different generations of revolutionaries: the surviving veterans of Sandino's army and
the new Marxists of the FSLN."94
Sandinista Construction of Democracy in Nicaragua
Jonas and Stein give the Sandinista Revolution credit for the construction of
democracy since 1979. "Nicaragua politics have been shaped first and foremost by the
nation's history and by particular constellations, or alliances, of class forces emerging
from that history to make the revolution."95 Jonas and Stein establish instances in which
the Sandinistas have "attempted to build pluralism into the structure of the revolution as
seen particularly in the 1984 elections, the 1986 Constitutional process, and the ongoing
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institutionalizing and political openings since the signing of 1987 Central America Peace
Accords." %
The victory of the revolution in 1979 against Somoza brought the political
coalition, Frente Sandinista de Liberacion National (FSLN) to power. The main
objectives of the Sandinistas were political pluralism through popular participation and
the creation of a mixed economy. The ideology of the "Nicaraguan Revolution is a blend
of Sandinismo (with its tradition of nationalism, anti-imperialism, and cross-class unity)
Marxism, and Liberation Theology."97 The Sandinistas focused on the needs of the
majority of the population. The impetus for the popular participation in politics was
promoted through mass organizations in which the people were encouraged to express
their support for programs and voice their opinions on issues affecting the country. The
United States under the Carter administration was supportive and provided aid in 1979.
Reagan changed course in 1980, viewing the Sandinista ideology as a threat.
The Reagan administration, with support from the U.S State Department, rewrote
what they called the early years of the Nicaraguan Revolution using quotes from a
September 1979 Sandinista document, which they renamed "The Seventy Two Hour
Document" and which they considered a "communist blue print." The objective was to
prove that the Sandinistas intention was not to maintain a "political pluralism and a
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mixed economy." Instead they claimed the September, 1979 document was just a scam to
cover their real plans in turning Nicaragua into a communist state.98
The Reagan administration believed that the Sandinista government's intention
was to create a one-party communist state and Reagan launched a war, despite the fact
that the U.S Congress opposed this idea. In Reagan's covert "Contra War" the United
States claimed that the freedom fighters were the contras, and the Sandinistas were
labeled as communists. Thus, the first attempts by the Sandinistas to practice democracy
failed to a great extent due to the United States intervention. The Sandinista government
promised to hold an election by 1984 as another way to prove the strength and purpose of
the revolution. The Sandinistas sent out "delegations around the world to study other
country's electoral laws. The government took the first step in institutionalizing the rights
of opposing parties, rather than leaving them to depend on the Sandinista good will, by
negotiating with them the law of political parties."99 This marked a start towards
democracy in the history of Nicaragua in which opposite political parties were granted
the right to compete and had great support from the government.100 Despite this support
the opposition parties were disgruntled too.
Immediately with news of the 1984 elections results, the United States claimed that
the Nicaraguan election was invalid, with secretary of State Richard Shultz calling the
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voting a " Soviet Style Sham." The claim was among the first open signs of activities in
the U.S itself that helped undermine the revolution. The Reagan Administration
continued to insist that Nicaragua did not have an elected government to run for
elections.101 Furthermore, the United States forced candidate Arturo Cruz of the
Coordinadora Democratica (CD) and Virgilio Godoy of the Partido Liberal
Institucionalista (PLI) to back out of the elections. The Reagan administration's main
ambition was to dishonor the Sandinista government instead of allowing Cruz to take part
in the election and respect the results from the vote of the Nicaraguan people. Overall the
United States government wanted to prove that there was no "freedom of elections in
Nicaragua."102
As part of the process of building Nicaragua as a democratic state, the Sandinistas
began writing and preparing to ratify a constitution. Following the 1984 election, the
development process for the Nicaraguan constitution was based on the participation of
both the Nicaraguan public and the political parties. The National Constituent Assembly
election in 1984 chose a Constitutional Commission formed by twelve members of the
FSLN or Sandinistas and ten others from different parties. The FSLN made sure it
occupied fewer seats in order to allow the participation of other parties,103 Writing of the
first draft of the Constitution took place between August and October of 1985, with the
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participation of "twenty four political parties, religious groups, labor and professional
unions and other organizations." The commission held meetings and discussion in order
to integrate many views. Copies of the constitution were handed out all over the country
to facilitate access to the Nicaraguan public allowing them voice and participation in the
issues the constitution addressed.
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Even though the Sandinistas promoted the formation of a strong democracy in
Nicaragua, once elected they had problems with political rights and civil liberties. The
fall of the Somoza Dynasty had marked the victory of the Sandinista Revolution and a
new start for the Nicaraguan people. The Sandinistas had won a victory towards
democracy but they had also inherited intense amounts of debt from the Somoza dynasty
that made their goals more challenging. The new government was faced with, an
Average deficit of 355 million dollars per year, and government deficits increasedfrom37
percent of the 300 million 1975 budget to 51 percent of the 439-million 1978 budget. Of the 1.44billion total public expenditures from 1975 to 1978, Nicaragua had financed 31 percent (459
million) through foreign borrowing. The new government came to power with the foreign
accounts of the treasury drawn down to zero and with an international public debt of 1.6
billion.105

The main goal for the Sandinista government once it came to power was to better
the living conditions of the majority of poor people and redistribute the wealth that was
concentrated in the hands of the Somoza family and a few aristocrat groups in Nicaragua.
The main focus was to make Nicaragua progress economically, socially and
democratically as a nation.

In 1977, the most underprivileged of the Nicaraguan
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population was barely surviving off 15 percent of the national income. By 1979 to 1980
there was an increase in unemployment making it more difficult for the poor to survive.
Despite these obstacles, by mid 1980's inequalities were slowly decreasing.106 One of the
objectives of the Sandinista government was to boost industrial and agricultural
production as well as public sector construction in order to create more jobs. This goal
did succeed for the first two years until 1981 at which time107"land distribution and
increases in the size of the armed forces took up much of the slack in employment so that
unemployment did not rise precipitously, remaining at 14 percent."108 Another main
concern for the Sandinista's government was "to raise real wages for the poor without
promoting inflation, and this aim led to caution in raising real wages."109 This to some
extent was successful in agriculture, since the land redistribution led to rise in the
production of goods and an increase in the earnings of a vast amount of peasants. The
state farm workers were able to acquire garden plots. This to some degree kept inflation
moderate despite the fact that the anti-inflation effort caused aggravation among workers
and unions. In spite of the attempts to moderate wages and prevent inflation, "food price
subsidies somewhat placated workers' concerns about wages, but subsidies reduction in
1981 and 1983 and the expanding currency supply fueled inflation, which eroded real
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wages more than 35 percent between 1981 and 1983."110 Additionally, the government
tried creating what it described as the "social salary," which consisted of a range of
public services intended to better the lives of the poor in Nicaragua.111
Best remembered were the literacy campaign and the fourfold increase in
spending for education, which was interrupted by the war, and thus its lasting effects
were very severely undermined. Though primary school education for the majority poor
has continued over the past three decades, communities continue to struggle to maintain
educational quality and high levels of enrollment. Literacy rates, measured after the
1980-1981 literacy crusade, remain substantial in spite of the varying quality of education
services between rural and city poor. Social Security payments and consistently more just
wage levels do continue into the 21 century and strong neighborhood organization efforts
continue as well, especially in communities where persons with strong leadership skills
which were developed through trainings in the 1980's, remain active. All in all, during
the half- decade following "The Triumph" of 1979 and before the Contra War consumed
the attention and efforts of substantial numbers of citizens and citizen-leaders, the list of
public services intended and delivered to better the lives of the poor in Nicaragua
included: construction of parks and recreation facilities in rural and poor city
neighborhoods; handicap rehabilitation; services for orphans and delinquent teens;
neighborhood cleanup campaigns; health, nutrition and hygiene workshops in poor
neighborhoods and vaccination campaigns against communicable diseases. In all,
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according to John Booth, by 1983 "service development and neighborhood improvement
programs for poor urban neighborhoods had improved the living conditions for an
estimated two hundred and fifty thousand people.112
Regardless of government efforts to improve the standard of living for the poor,
the "Contra War" crippled the advancement of these programs. The government's budget
and resources were limited in fully carrying out, the continuation of many public services
fully. In spite of these obstacles the Sandinista government had, by 1984, accomplished
their goal to redistribute some of the wealth that had been strongly concentrated in the
hands of the Somoza family to the majority of the poor in Nicaragua.113
The Contra War
The Ronald Reagan administration viewed the Sandinista government as a threat
to their hegemony in the Western hemisphere.

The Sandinista's revolution was

especially threatening since this was a period of time during which the Cold War was at it
height. Fear that the Soviet Union would continue to influence Communist ideas in
Nicaragua was the first reason the U.S gave for intervention. Former National Security
adviser, Robert McFarlane, suggested that "the influence of communism in Nicaragua is
strong and as a result it is necessary to apply the Reagan Doctrine. Nicaragua is in the
backyard of U.S. territory, meaning that an enemy influence like the Soviet Union in this
region will interfere with U.S ability to be in control and to dictate events elsewhere in
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the Third World."114 The United States felt that the fact that Nicaragua was in its
backyard made it more urgent for them to promote removal of the Sandinista
government.
Once the United States intervened in Nicaragua there was worldwide criticism of
its violation of international laws. The constant criticism of the war encouraged the
Democrat -controlled House of Representative to call for a stop of U.S aid of the war.
However, this did not stop the Reagan administration from continuing its mission of
removing the Sandinistas. Oliver North, a White House emissary was sent out to
Honduras to communicate to the FDN leaders that the president Reagan was still
determined to remove the Sandinista government from power.115
The "Contra War," aside from being illegal, made it significantly difficult for the
Sandinista government to prosper. The social programs that were developed to help better
the standard of living of the Nicaraguan people were jeopardized by the war. The war
took away the vision of the revolution. Instead, the Sandinistas had to invest in a war that
decreased progress for the Nicaraguan society. Furthermore, the Sandinistas restricted
civil liberties and political rights, leading to a decrease in support from the Nicaraguan
people.
The end of the cold war triggered the U.S to stop its support to the "Contras." This
paved the way for elections and a victory towards democracy. The election of a new
president marked a new era for Nicaragua and its democratic process.

1U1U.

5

Ibid.

41

Nevertheless, the results of the 1990 elections took the Sandinista party by
surprise, as they had felt sure of their victory. President Ortega was aware that the main
concern of the Nicaraguan people was to end the Contra War and the U.S embargo that
was holding back Nicaragua's ability to grow economically and democratically. Ortega
admits that the main reason for his defeat was the lack of assurance to the majority of
Nicaraguans that the war would end if they won the elections. He also pointed out that
Nicaraguans felt that United States would only come to peace if Violeta Chamorro were
elected. Ortega argued that the U.S officials were not going to change their policies
toward Nicaragua even if his party had won the elections fairly.116
Violeta Chamorro, with 55 percent of the votes, did unseat Ortega. Chamorro was
the widow of Pedro Chamorro, editor of La Prensa, the opposition Newspaper against the
Somoza government, making her a great candidate for the opposition party Union
Nacional Opositora (UNO). The anti-Sandinista coalition, UNO, was created with the
following parties:

Conservatives, Independent Liberals, Social Christians, Social

Democrats, Socialist and Communist. Despite tense moments the transition was
ultimately peaceful.
Chamorro's victory indicated to the world that Nicaragua was transforming into a
new era. Nicaragua was at another point of change, manifested through a second
democratic election and movement way from a socialist to a conservative democratic
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government.117

Chamorro's vision was "both conservative and democratic,"11 by

increasing civil liberties and creating free market policies meant to build the Nicaraguan
economy. The Nicaraguan people believed that Chamorro would be able to bring
prosperity and economic growth and build a strong democratic state. The United States
ended the embargo and aid to the Contras right after Chamorro took office,119 Chamorro
assumed power by the end of April, promising the Nicaraguan people a 100-day
immediate recovery plan for the economy that would be accomplished through major
support and assistance from the U.S. The 100-day recovery plan resulted in the
abolishment of many of the social programs that the Sandinistas had accomplished over
the eleven years.

Her "presidential decrees sought to return businesses and land

confiscated by the revolutionary government to their previous owners. Classic neoliberal
economic policies sought to dismiss thousands of government workers and privatize
state-owed businesses."120 Under Chamorro the social programs that the Sandinistas
created, such as health care, education and literacy programs, suffered budget cuts.

In

reality, the years of instability during the Contra War weakened the Sandinistas' public
support and the Nicaraguan people wanted change. Nicaraguans voted for Chamorro
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because they wanted to transition from a socialist government that had influenced conflict
and war into a market economy that would bring economic growth. However, this new
market economy led to the loss of many Sandinista social programs and an increase in
class inequalities. Chamorro was able to assure better civil liberties, but her neoliberal
economics failed to protect the poor. Party division between liberals, conservatives and
Sandinismo re -emerged. The struggle for political domination continues among these
122

parties.
The 1990 election was a vital point for Nicaraguan citizens taking charge in
electing the next government. The Nicaraguan people were following closely what each
candidate had to offer, making sure that they chose the right candidate suitable for
Nicaragua. Chamorro was successful at bringing together a coalition of parties that
offered the Nicaragua economy a new path and citizens a change of regime, aside from
the fact that most of her neoliberal economics did not effectively protect those social
programs that the Sandinista era had attempted. The Contra War, along with the United
States embargo, had reduced the Sandinista's public support. Still, by the end of
Chamorro government many Nicaraguans wanted some type of safety net reminiscent of
the Sandinista program.
The Sandinistas entered the 1996 campaign divided, creating the new
Renovisionist Sandinista movement (MRS). Ortega tried to reinvent his image to the
Nicaraguan people, but the years of war and embargo haunted his new campaign. The
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Liberal Alliance had a new face, Arnoldo Aleman, who previously was the mayor of
Managua. His campaign promoted both a "free market and a social safety net,"123 that
most

Nicaraguans

believed

would

strengthen

Nicaragua

economically

and

democratically. Once Aleman won the 1996 elections his government was clearly more
devoted toward the rich than Chamorro had been, and promises made during his
campaign were unfulfilled. Aleman's main recognition during his years as president was
his greed for power. His policies and attitude slowed Nicaragua's ability to prosper
democratically even more. His market economy allowed the rich to accumulate more
wealth while increasing inequalities among the poor.124 His government was filled with
corruption "he disregarded many aspects of fiscal law and encouraged his Liberal Party
supporters in the National Assembly and elsewhere to do the same."125
After six years of corruption under the Aleman government Nicaraguans were
again ready for change. In the 2001 elections, the new face for the Liberal Party was
Enrique Bolanos, former vice president of Aleman. During his campaign he sought to
distant himself from Aleman's dishonest government. Chamorro was a strong supporter
of Bolanos. She assured the Nicaraguan people that better days would come, to be
patient, and that Bolanos would continue the work and changes she made during her
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government.126 Bolanos campaigned against his strongest opponent, Ortega. This time
Ortega tried to change his appearance by wearing casual civilian clothes instead of his red
and black Sandinistas colors. He also emphasized the poverty that still existed and the
priority his government would place in providing a better standard of living for the
127

poor.
However, Bolanos won the 2001 elections and upon his inauguration he stood by
his promise to the Nicaraguan people to respect the rule of law by calling on legislation to
remove Aleman from his self-imposed immunity. Bolanos joined the National Assembly
along with Sandinista activists to remove Aleman's immunity. The legislators finally
voted to remove Aleman's immunity; he was sentenced to prison for corruption charges
and for the immunity he had attempted to set up for himself.128
Nicaragua's Current Government
The 2006 election brought Ortega back to power. Ortega has a unique approach to
the issues the country faces; according to news reports he has spent a great deal of time
trying to fix and change things to his favor so that he can remain in power.129 He has also
allied himself with Arnoldo Aleman, the former president convicted of corruption and
sentenced to prison during his years as president. Arnoldo Aleman, who still forms part
126
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of the Liberal Party is speculated to have formed a political pact with Ortega. "El pacto,"
in which the two former enemies conspired to change the constitution to give the
Sandinistas "almost an equal number of seats on the supreme Court, the Comptroller's
Office and in the Federal Electoral Council."130 Ever since the allegations began,
Aleman's sentence has been cut from 20 years to five and his house arrest now allows
him to travel throughout the country. Ortega's adviser on Social Affairs defends his
alliance with Aleman, arguing that it was done for "the sake of building an anti-oligarchic
front. According to this theory, Aleman and the Somozas represented an emergent
capitalist class that took on the old oligarchy, which has dominated Nicaraguan politics
and the economy since the 19th century."1
According to an analyst of the Heritage Foundation Ortega is
caught between conflicting priorities: a mix of economic policies that would boost
investor confidence and be good for Nicaragua's versus his goals of consolidating power and
building a socialist State. While working with private capitalist and foreign investors in the
background, he has been condemning the "Savage capitalist" and has kicked off a traditional
campaign to buy votes among the poor with handout promises of "a cow, a pig, poultry and seeds
to 75,000 rural families.132

Since Ortega became re-elected he has promised the poor in Nicaragua "Free
education, health care and medicine" as it was available during the Sandinista
administration in the 1980's. In Ortega's "2008 budget, announced in October 2007, he
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did dramatically increase funding for education and health care, but at the expense of a
large deficit. The government has not yet explained how it will cover the deficit and
could be tempted to suspend debt services and default on Nicaragua's external debt"
As reported by the Economist in 2007, Ortega has "fired four ministers and a
number of junior officials for speaking out of turn, all in just a short nine months of
office."134 Critics have charged that Daniel Ortega has been more worried about his
friendship with Venezuelan President, Hugo Chavez than the issues Nicaragua is facing.
Chavez has offered Ortega "power plants, tractors and factories. These will be financed
by soft loans from Venezuelan state banks, according to Miguel Gomez, the Venezuelan
ambassador in Managua."135 Chavez has pledged to build a pipeline across Nicaragua to
the Pacific to carry Venezuela crude oil for shipment to refineries in China and Japan, but
to date this has not materialized.
Ortega's government has promised the Nicaraguan people it will continue the
vision of the first revolutionary government. He initiated an innovative number of social
programs with populist titles such as "zero hunger," "Houses for the people," and "zero
unemployment."137 He implemented a literacy campaign with the objective of lowering
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the illiteracy rate that had grown to a 35 percent in 2007, as a continuation of the literacy
crusade of the 1980s.138 Ortega has accomplished "important progress in energy
production and road construction, while social programs providing loans for women,
handouts to farmers, and drinking water, and land titles to the rural poor."139 Most of this
support can be credited to Chavez who gave the Ortega government 457 million in aid in
2008, according to data from the Central Bank.140
Ortega has also welcomed assistance from Iran's President, Mahmud
Ahmadinejad, who has offered 350 million dollars for a new port. Ortega met up with
Iranian Deputy Energy Minister Hamid Chitchian to help construct several hydroelectric
plants to help solve the energy crisis in Nicaragua. So far Iran has committed itself to
help build just one plant. Nicaragua continues to deal with blackouts almost daily, so this
plant is crucial in beginning to solve a major problem.141 The Ortega government has
received harsh criticism from opposition parties for his friendship with former president
Aleman and his lack of effort in making sure Nicaragua progresses economically. Despite
the criticism, the Nicaraguan government continues to receive credit for moving forward
towards improving the lives of the majority of the poor.
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Since the 1990s' elections to the present, Nicaragua has sought to build a strong
democracy. The Chamorro government marked the end of a socialist era and the
beginning of a new regime. With the Liberal Party control for the past 16 years this
symbolizes progress towards democracy. Nicaragua's people have been able to
participate and vote for the government of their choice, triumphing over the years of
Somoza authoritarianism. Democracy has finally been accomplished, though poverty still
remains as part of the lives of most Nicaraguans. Nicaragua continues to search for a
government that will meet the needs of the majority of Nicaraguans and alleviate the
economic problems the country faces.

Table 2: Periods of Political Development
Period

Historical Time frame

Regime Type

Somoza Dynasty

1936-1979

Dictatorship

Sandinista

1979-1990

Revolution

Violeta Chamorro

1990-1997

Democracy

Arnoldo Aleman

1997-2002

Democracy

Enrique Bolanos

2002-2007

Democracy

Daniel Ortega

Assumed office 2007

Democracy
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The table above offers a summary of the time periods and regime types that
constitute an historical overview of Nicaragua over the past 70 years. The Somoza
regime, labeled as a dictatorship, lasted 43 years and was filled with widespread human
rights violations. Somoza ruled and controlled Nicaragua through the National Guard,
which constituted the core of his Dynasty. During the Sandinista era from 1979-1990
there were attempts to have elections but the opposition did not participate. Once the
Contra War began they were faced with violation of civil liberties and political rights.
The revolution best describes this era since it marks the transition period between the end
of the Somoza dynasty and it takes place during a time that Nicaragua was at war. The
Violeta Chamorro era indicates the start of a new regime in which Nicaraguans were able
to vote under a democracy.
CHAPTER IV

Analysis of Nicaragua growth and the effect of Democracy since 1990's
Nicaragua's economic growth is going to be analyzed at the micro and macro levels.
This study will be divided into two sections: a macro level analysis based on World Bank
Development Indicators, and a micro level analysis based upon survey data from the
Latin American Public Opinion Project. The analysis will determine whether macro and
micro level measures of economic development are influenced by democratic
governance.
The independent variable democracy is going to be defined as "the principle of
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consent of the governed. The term implies that the people of a country or territory are
sovereign and consent, in a direct referendum or through elected representatives, to the
establishment of their own government."142 Table 2 categorizes political development in
Nicaragua, noting the timeframe of the current democratic government.
To measure the dependent variable, this analysis relies upon multiple indicators. The
analysis will include measures of poverty. Poverty will be defined as a deprivation of
fundamental human needs such as the right to, health care, education, and access to clean
water, protection and shelter. To better understand how democracy affects the poor at
domestic level, poverty will be measured through economic measures that exclude social
welfare issues such as gender and equality. To further understand whether or not
democracy translate into growth, changes in the poverty rate will be measured through
indicators such as life expectancy at birth, improved water resources available to the
population and mortality rate under age five. Additionally, the primary education
completion rate will be examined. These are the social indicators most frequently used by
politicians and international organizations to determine the growth of a nation at a
domestic level. It is important to keep in mind there is missing data in some time periods
since it is a fact that instability and poverty tend to undermine data collection.
In addition to poverty, the analysis will also include measures of economic growth and
wealth. Nicaragua's economic growth will be measured through the GNP per capita and
electric power consumption. These two economic indicators will provide insight into
142
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Nicaragua's growth and industralization. Democracy is going to be measured through the
GNP per capita since its best suited to analyze the level of growth Nicaragua has attained
since it became a democratic nation. The GNP per capita measures Nicaragua's growth
at a national level this does not capture the levels of poverty that persist in Nicaragua
domestically.
Both the economic and social indicators will demonstrate that a level of growth in
prosperity and well-being has occurred in Nicaragua beginning even in a part of the
Somoza era in 1960 and continuing through the revolution and four elections up to 2006.
The only national economic indicator presented here for the Somoza Era is evidence of
electric consumption in Nicaragua. Electric power consumption, starting from 1970,
shows a slight increase, which quickly decreases, in the early 1970's. However, by mid1970 the Somoza government era shows a high level of performance in electric
consumption, with the increase continuing up to the end of the regime.
At the beginning of the Sandinista era 1980, electric consumption decreases but then
shows some growth by mid 1980's, once again decreasing by the end of their term. Also
in the Chamorro term, there is a good start in the electric consumption that decreases by
mid 1990's. By 1996, as Aleman's government begins, there is an increase in electric
consumption with only a slight decrease in late 1990 and quickly again, growth into the
2000's. Bolanos government shows a continuation of the increase in electric consumption
and this carries over into the new Sandinista era in 2006. It is interesting to note that the
highest level of electric consumption were reached in the mid-1970's were lost and not
regained until mid- 2000's.
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World Bank Development Indicators: Economic Indicators
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The data collected for the electric power consumption shows that slowly
Nicaragua is heading towards becoming a more industrialized country. The data
demonstrate a slight growth in energy consumption in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
remaining neutral during the early 1990's and increasing into the late 1990s. The 1990s
mark the beginning of a new regime with Violeta Chamorro's presidency. During her
term, energy consumption is at the lowest, declining for most of her term. By the late
1990s, energy consumption starts to increase. In the 2000's energy consumption is at its
highest and continues to grow in the mid 2000's, showing progress for Nicaragua.
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The GNI per capita excludes the Somoza government due to a lack of data. At the
initiation of the Sandinista government in the 1980's, the graph shows a slight increase
that continues into early 1980's with a small decline by mid 1980's but continuing its
increase into late 1980's. Then, drastic decreases appear in the late 1980's near the end of
their term. Chamorro's government experienced the lowest level of GNI per capita. Her
government started with a small increase in 1990 that drastically declined during her term
though somewhat increasing by mid 1990's. During Aleman's government the GNI per
capita continued its increase till the end of his term. Followed by Bolanos government the
GNI per capita showed a constant increase that remained up to the beginning of the
current government of Ortega.
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In the early 1990s there is a drastic decline in GNI per capita which then slowly
shows increase into the 1990s. And in the early 2000's, a drastic increase appears which
continues into the mid- 2000's. Under a democratic system, Nicaragua has experienced
growth and industralization as the GNI per capita and the electric power comsumption
rates have shown. The question remains: Have these factors led to tangible improvements
in people's lives? Has there been poverty reduction, or a reduction in the social problems
linked to poverty?The following four social indicators: life expectancy at birth, mortality
rate, primary school completion rate and improved water source will be used to analyze
the impact of these indicators in relation to the reduction of poverty in nicaragua. Such
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social and economic indicators are commonly used to determine the level of poverty and
social problems that Third World nations encounter.
Social

Indicators
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The social indicator, life expectancy at birth, gives strong evidence that health
care assistance has drastically improved in Nicaragua since the 1960's. The line shown
above illustrates a steady growth in life expectancy at birth. Since then, up to late in the
first decade of the 21 st century, the line continues up, showing a 20% increase over the
40-year period and indicating that progress continues.
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The primary school completion rate shows a steady growth in 1970's during the
Somoza government transition into the Sandinista era. Very early in the 1980's the
Sandinista government accomplished an increase in primary school completion, which
decreased by mid- 1980's and then continued to increase again in the early 1990's. The
Chamorro government continued the trend of increased in primary school completion and
Aleman's government maintained this increase. Though at the beginning of Bolanos
government there is a slight decrease, an immediate but brief increase in early 2000,
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decreasing once again within a short time frame and remaining the same for most of his
presidential term. Under the current government and second Ortega administration, an
increase in primary school completion rate occurs and remains steady. Thus, primary
school completion rates are at their lowest in the early 1990's with some increase by mid
1990's but with much missing data for about five years. With increases again in 2000,
mostly maintained up to the current date, it is fair to draw the conclusion that most
Nicaraguan are now able to have at least some degree of basic education compared to all
of the earlier years.
_ Somoza-Mortality rate,
under-5 (per 1,000)
Sandinista-Mortality rate,
under-5 (per 1,000)
Democracy-Mortality
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In 1970, during the Somoza era, the infant mortality rate starts to slowly decrease
from its rather high rate, continuing a slow decline up to the end the regime in 1979.
During the early Sandinista years the decrease in mortality rates consistently continues up
to the end of their government rule in 1990 despite the missing data. Mortality rates
remain low throughout the Chamorro, ALeman and Bolanos government eras. During the
earliest years of the second Ortega government, the decrease in mortality rate continues.
Thus, mortality rates have decreased consistently and significantly over the entire
40-year period indicating a consistent and probable significant improvement in health
care and physical well-being for the average Nicaraguan. More Nicaraguans are able to
get better medical attention for children under age five.
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Despite missing data examined in this paper, improvements in water resources appear
to have been consistently rising in Nicaragua. An improved water source is an important
social indicator in the reduction of poverty and ill health and thus is an important
reflection of growth in national well being. The data above indicate that the Nicaraguan
population has much greater access to improved water resources, indicating notable
progress toward the reduction of poverty.
The social and economic indicators listed show that the living standards for the poor
are improving but still in progress. This hypothesis testing provides insight regarding
areas of progress made since Nicaragua became a democratic nation in the 1990s. The
GNI per capita and the electric power consumption provides some evidence that
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Nicaragua is working towards becoming a more industrialized country in spite of
showing some set backs in the early 1990s. We still observe some progress in the late
2000s leaving hope for more improvement in the years to come. Primary school
completion rates are significantly higher indicating that most Nicaraguans are at least
able to have some degree of education now compared to the years under dictatorship. We
can observe this improvement in education beginning with the Sandinista literacy
campaign. The Sandinista literacy campaign set the stage for a more educated Nicaraguan
population that continued under democracy. In the mortality rates and life expectancy at
birth we observe a great amount of progress in health care and assistance for the average
Nicaraguan. The Nicaraguan population has improved water resources as well. All of the
social indicators reported here give strong indication that Nicaragua, since it became a
democratic nation, has increased the standard of living for the average. It appears these
changes will continue with the extension of democratic institutions in Nicaragua.
Analysis of Nicaragua
LAPOP surveys 1991 and2008 (individual responses)
To complement this analysis of macro indicator, this study also examines how
Nicaraguans view their welfare. Using the LAPOP survey data gathered during the year
of 1991 and the year 2008, this section will examine individual responses on the level of
satisfaction Nicaraguans have with their lives. These individual responses will only
include urban respondents as the 1991 survey was only conducted in urban areas. The
LAPOP survey since the 1970s has collected survey data in Latin America on a variety of
political topics, such as support for the democratic system, citizen confidence, assessment
and participation in the political system both nationally and locally, as well as measuring
63

the levels of corruption and victimization that affect the impact of democracy and
economic growth. 143

Previous economic and social indicators were able to offer a glimpse at the
national level of progress, but these do not show how citizens view these changes. These
micro data will assess citizens owns personal opinions, as well as examine their personal
economic situation through their possessions or consumer goods. The following chart and
graphs will demonstrate the percentage of possession and consumer goods. They will also
answer an important question How satisfied are Nicaraguans with their lives?144

143
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This is the only question on citizens satisfaction comparable between 1991 and 2008.
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The charts above analyze individual responses comparing 1991 and 2008 material
well being (income, goods, access to services) from the LAPOP surveys as well as
individual perceptions of prosperity to determine how satisfied Nicaraguans are with their
lives in 1991 and 2008 using the same LAPOP surveys. The individual response survey
shows that material well being for the Nicaraguans surveyed have improved. Between
1991 and 2008, the main changes we recognize are the "access to a vehicle" suggesting
that fewer Nicaraguan's have access to a vehicle compared to 1990's. The differences in
the individual responses of 1991 are significantly different from those of 2008, aside
from vehicle access. This indicates that the ability to access certain indicators of material
well-being is, for the average Nicaraguan, improving since Nicaragua became a
democratic state.
Despite the fact that most Nicaraguans are better able to have access to certain
consumer goods, which are important, factors in measuring a economic prosperity, this
measure of growth does not capture the level of access to public services that could
reduce poverty, such as access to public libraries, parks and recreations, transportation,
property protection, welfare and social security. These latter items are difficult to
measure, as surveys in 1991 did not include items measuring citizen access to such
goods. Still, this could be a valuable venue for future field research, if documentation of
government expenditures in these areas were to become readily available.
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Based on the survey that asked, how satisfied are you with your life? Between
1991 and 2008 Nicaraguans continue to be satisfied with their lives. While more people
seem to be somewhat unsatisfied with their lives in 2008, still the number of those
satisfied with their lives has increased in comparison to 1990's respondents. Also, fewer
Nicaraguans are unsatisfied with their lives than those in 1990s. What is evident is that
despite the poverty that continues to prevail in Nicaragua, most Nicaraguans seemed to
be satisfied or somewhat satisfied with their lives.
While Nicaragua has made some gains at the micro and macro levels, it is
important to note that corruption has been a persistent problem, which could wipe out the
gains made under democracy. As the figure below indicates, corruption has been an
ongoing problem in Nicaragua under democracy, peaking in the late 1990's and rising
again in the late 2000s.
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CHAPTER V

Conclusion
Does democracy help the poor?
Democracy Helps
•

Doh Chull Shi argues, "Citizens of democratic
states experience a far better quality of life than
those in non-democracies."145

Democracy Hurts
• Michael Ross "democracies spend more money on
education and health care than non-democracies, but
these benefits seem to accrue to middle and upper
income groups."149

•

David Brown and Wendy Hunter add,
"Democratic regimes are associated with higher
rates of social expenditures when faced with
important economic constraints."146

• Przeworski and Limongi suggest, "we do not know
whether democracy fosters or hinders economic
growth."

•

Thomas Zweifel and Patricio Navia report,
"Fewer children die in democracies than in
dictatorships."147

• Helliwell adds "democracy on subsequent economic
growth, the evidence in this article pours cold
water on the notion that introducing democracy is
likely to accelerate subsequent growth."151

•

Hiskey concludes, "The demand-based approach
to fighting poverty is greatly enhanced by a
democratic local political environment." 48

• De Haan and Siermann suggest that, "the
relationship between democracy and economic

Doh Chull Shin, " On the Third Wave of Democratization: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent
Theory and Research," World Politics 1 (October 1994): 156.
146

David S. Brown and Wendy Hunter Brown, " Democracy and Social Spending in Latin America," The
American Political Science Review 4 (December 1999): 779.
147

Thomas D. Zweifel and Patricio Navia, " Democracy, Dictartorship and Infant Mortality," Journal of
Democracy 2( April 2000): 99.
148

Jonathan Hiskey, " Demand-Based Development and Local Electoral Enviroment in Mexico,"
Comparative Politics 1 ( October 2003): 56.
149

Michael Ross, " Is Democracy Good for the Poor?," American Journal of Political Science 4 (October
2006): 860.
150

Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi ."Political Regimes and Economic Growth," Journal of

69

growth is not robust."15"1
•

Erich Weede concludes ,"the overall effect of
political democracy on economic growth is
negative, but rather weak."153

• Mitchell Seligson, "In Nicaragua, the study finds
evidence supporting the World Bank's hypothesis
of a link between corruption and erosion of belief
in the legitimacy of the political system." 4

So, does democracy help the poor? Certainly democracy is apart of the
ingredients necessary to allow solid establishment of factors that promote social and
political rights. In the case of Nicaragua, an examination of the question for the 30-year
period between the Sandinista revolution and what is foreseen in 2010 requires caution
and the naming of crucial missing ingredients. Much more than a free election is required
for democracy to help the poor. Those running must have vision, integrity, and a clear
plan as well as, the support of the electorate and freedom from outside influence.
Deep shame on the part of some informed North Americans over the part played
in derailing the Sandinista experiment would be expected but is insufficient to correct any
current woes. On the ground in Nicaragua, the process since the end of the Contra war
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has been, largely, a co-opting of the electoral system, a mixing of religious conservatism
with political machinations. This has led many to wonder what the future holds for
Nicaragua?
What remains is a history of five elections with enough markings of fairness to
claim them successful enough by a measure of 'democratic.' Current president Daniel
Ortega has argued that he aims to make a new fight to change the system: to get back to
the agenda of the people he calls for a socially responsive agenda that matches policy
with the needs of the people. The reality is that all there is left in Nicaragua is hope for
change. The constant battle among different political parties has seriously delayed the
process of growth in Nicaragua.
The question still remains: Does democracy help the poor? Various authors were
able to offer plausible explanation as to why democracy helps or hurt the poor. Does
democracy help in the case of Nicaragua? The analysis used in this research finds that
democracy does help the poor in Nicaragua. What is missing, as discussed by various
authors, is a transparent and accountable system in which the Nicaraguan public can trust.
For democracy to prosper in a nation filled with a history of instability and conflict of
interest among those who govern, it is crucial that we enforce what democracy preaches.
Democracy requires direct participation and accountability from both citizens and
government. Democracy is everyone's responsibility. Until we all assume such
responsibility, we will continue to struggle but barely attain a stable democracy in
Nicaragua. While some might argue that voting constitutes the core of a strong
democracy, in the case of Nicaragua, transparent and honest elections have been held at
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least since Violeta Chamorro took office in 1990. Still Nicaragua remains with high
levels of corruption as shown in the CPI scores in the graph above and the poor remain
poor. The essence of a strong democracy is the informed consent of the governed. We the
people should be able and active in every decision made by those whom were elected to
govern.
From the graphs from the World Bank it can be argued that the standard of living
for the poor in Nicaragua is improving and that democracy has brought some economic
growth. Still the data from the LAPOP surveys in two different time periods 1991 and
2008 show that the level of improvements does not indicate any drastic increase in
growth of material well being. The increase in consumer possession is significant, but not
dramatic. Poverty remains a crucial problem. On the other hand, there appears to be some
level of satisfaction among most Nicaraguans regarding their lives. We can argue that
democracy did help the poor by opening the door to part take in the building of a strong
democracy in Nicaragua. Finally it can be said that despite the poverty levels that do
prevail among Nicaraguans based on the LAPOP surveys, Nicaraguans are somewhat
satisfied with their lives. The struggle the nation went through to remove the years of
somozismo and many thousands of the fallen heroes who fought for a better Nicaragua
might be justified by these levels of satisfaction. To the same extent democracy seems to
have helped the poor, allowing those who lived under an oppressive regime for years to
fight for a better future for Nicaragua. While poverty still remains a problem the struggle
has allowed the poor, to begin to participate in the political process.
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